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Abstract—Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs) enable opportunis-
tic access to the licensed channel resources by allowing unli-
censed users to exploit vacant channel opportunities. One effective
technique through which unlicensed users, often referred to as
Secondary Users (SUs), acquire whether a channel is vacant is
cooperative spectrum sensing. Despite its effectiveness in enabling
CRN access, cooperative sensing suffers from location privacy
threats, merely because the sensing reports that need to be
exchanged among the SUs to perform the sensing task are highly
correlated to the SUs’ locations. In this paper, we develop a
new Location Privacy for Optimal Sensing (LPOS) scheme that
preserves the location privacy of SUs while achieving optimal
sensing performance through voting-based sensing. In addition,
LPOS is the only alternative among existing CRN location privacy
preserving schemes (to the best of our knowledge) that ensures high
privacy, achieves fault tolerance, and is robust against the highly
dynamic and wireless nature of CRNs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs) have emerged as a key
technology for improving spectrum utilization through oppor-
tunistic spectrum access. They do so by allowing unlicensed
spectrum users, often referred to as Secondary Users (SUs), to
identify and exploit unused opportunities of licensed channels,
so long as they do not cause any interference to licensed users,
often referred to as Primary Users (PUs) [1].
Two main approaches can be used by SUs to acquire whether
PUs are present in a licensed channel [2]. The first approach is
based on geo-location databases and is very similar to what is
used in LBSs (location-based services). The second approach,
referred to as cooperative spectrum sensing, relies on the SUs
themselves to visit and sense the licensed channels, on a regular
basis, to collaboratively decide whether a channel is vacant or
not. In this paper, we focus on the cooperative spectrum sensing
approach whose general architecture is shown in Fig. 1. In this
architecture, the Fusion Center (FC ) is the entity responsible
for orchestrating the SUs to perform the sensing task so as to
collectively decide whether PUs are present or not. Through a
control channel, FC queries SUs, each having sensing capability,
to tune to specific channels/frequencies, measure the energy level
(known as Received Signal Strength (RSS)) observed in each
of these channels, and report the observed RSS values back to
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Fig. 1: Cooperative spectrum sensing architecture
FC 2. FC then first combines the RSS values collected from the
different SUs and then compares the combined value against a
detection threshold, τ , to decide whether a channel is available.
Channel availability decisions are sent back to the SUs to rely
on during their opportunistic spectrum access.
Despite its effectiveness in improving sensing performance,
cooperative sensing suffers from many security and privacy
threats that make SUs shy away from participating in the
cooperative sensing task. One of these threats is location dis-
closure. Cooperative spectrum sensing exploits spatial diversity
for enhancing accuracy of sensing and this can jeopardize the
location privacy of SUs. It has been shown in [4] that RSS
values are heavily correlated to the SUs’ physical locations, thus
making it not too difficult to compromise the location privacy
of SUs. Disclosing the location information is undesirable es-
pecially when FC is run by an untrusted service provider [5].
The fine-grained location data can be used to determine a lot
of information about an individual’s beliefs, preferences, and
behavior [6]. In fact, by analyzing location traces of a user,
an adversary can learn that he/she regularly goes to a hospital,
and may then sell this information to pharmaceutical advertisers
without the user’s consent. In addition, malicious adversaries
with criminal intent could use this information to pose a threat
to an individual’s security and privacy. Being aware of such
potential privacy risks, SUs may not want to share their data
with FC s or databases [6], making the need for preserving the
location privacy of these users of a high importance.
This paper addresses the SUs’ location disclosure threat,
considered as one of the most important threats to CRN users’
privacy, by designing a protocol that guarantees a high location
privacy by concealing the RSS values from FC while enabling
optimal sensing using the half-voting rule proposed in [7].
2Energy detection is the most popular method for signal detection due to its simplicity
and small sensing time [3].
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A. Related Work
Although lots of research efforts have already been made
when it comes to addressing issues related protocol design [8],
resource optimization [9]–[11], spectrum sensing [2], and per-
formance modeling and analysis [12], [13], very little has been
made in regards to location privacy issues [4], [14]. For instance,
Shuai Li et al. [4] showed that location information of SUs could
be inferred from the sensing reports, and called this attack Single
CR Report Location Privacy (SRLP) attack. Another attack in
the same context occurs when a user joins or leaves the network.
Any malicious entity can estimate the report of a user and
hence its location from the variations in the final aggregated
RSS measurements when the node joins and leaves the network.
This is termed Differential Location Privacy attack. To cope with
these attacks, the authors propose PPSS, a Privacy Preserving
collaborative Spectrum Sensing protocol, that uses secret sharing
and the Privacy Preserving Aggregation (PPA) process to hide
the content of specific sensing reports. It also uses dummy report
injections to cope with the Differential Location Privacy attack.
However, PPSS has several limitations. First, it requires all the
sensing reports in order to decode the aggregated result, which
makes it quite impractical since the wireless channel may be
unreliable, making some sensing reports not accessible by FC .
Hence, FC will not be able to decrypt the aggregated sensing
result. Moreover, it cannot cope with the dynamics resulting
when multiple users join or leave the network simultaneously.
In addition, the pairwise secret sharing process incurs extra
communication overhead, which results in an additional delay
especially when all the keys need to be updated when a user
joins or leaves the network. Also, the encryption scheme used
here is practical only when the plaintext space is small, since
the decryption of the aggregated result requires solving the DLP
problem, which is very costly as shown in Table II.
Despite the importance of this issue and the potential that
CRNs present, little attention has been paid to this problem. This
drove us to look outside the context of CRNs and try to find an
approach that might be applied to our setup. We were particularly
interested in the work proposed by Chen et al. [14] where they
present a privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme with fault
tolerance for smart grid communications, termed PDAFT. They
considered a setting very similar to the one we study in this
work, and tried to preserve users’ privacy when smart meters
installed within each house sense the consumption information
and send it to the control center.
PDAFT combines Paillier cryptosystem with Shamir’s secret
sharing, where a set of smart meters sense the consumption of
different households, encrypt their reports using Paillier, then
send them to a gateway. The gateway multiplies these reports
and forwards the result to the control center, which selects a
number of servers (among all servers) to cooperate in order
to decrypt the aggregated result. However, PDAFT requires a
dedicated gateway to collect the encrypted data and a minimum
number of working servers in the control center to be able to
decrypt the aggregated result. In addition, PDAFT, like most of
the aggregation-based methods, is prone to differential attacks
that we mentioned earlier, and does not provide a mechanism
that prevents this attack. Another drawback, which is common
to simple aggregation-based methods, is that they usually do not
provide optimal sensing performance and might be affected by
the distribution of the RSS values. Throughout this paper, by
optimal sensing we mean final decision accuracy regrading the
channel availability.
B. Our Contribution
We developed LPOS, a new location privacy for optimal
sensing scheme in CRNs. Its main idea lies in enabling privacy-
preserving comparison of RSS values and FC ’s threshold in
an efficient manner via a novel integration of Order Preserving
Encryption (OPE) [15] and Yao’s Millionaires’ protocol [16].
We summarize the key features of our scheme below, compare
it in Table I to other schemes, and give detailed performance
analysis and comparison in Section V.
The key features of LPOS are:
1) Optimal Sensing: To the best of our knowledge, LPOS is
the first scheme that enables location privacy in CRNs with an
optimal spectrum sensing performance. It does so by privacy-
preserving realization of the half-voting rule proposed in [7],
which has been shown to be the optimal decision rule for
spectrum sensing using energy detection. Unlike aggregation
methods that may be vastly impacted by the distribution of RSS
values (and misleading FC to make inaccurate decisions), this
rule enjoys an optimal sensing performance.
2) High Location Privacy: Unlike some aggregation type pro-
tocols [4], [14], LPOS does not leak RSS information when
users join/leave the network, nor does it require dummy report
injection to prevent differential attacks as done in [4].
3) Fault Tolerance: In our scheme, if some users cannot sense
the channels or fail to send their reports, FC only needs to
update the voting threshold, λ, with the available users to make
an accurate decision. However, some existing schemes cannot
handle such failures. For example, PPSS [4] requires inputs from
all (pre-determined) users to be able to decrypt the aggregated
RSS and make a decision. LPOS does not have such a limitation,
since it relies on a voting-based approach and FC evaluates each
contribution of users towards the decision individually, which
makes LPOS more fault-tolerant compared to PPSS [4].
4) Scalability and Computational Efficiency: LPOS offers the
smallest communication overhead among its counterparts for
large network sizes, and its computational complexity is log-
arithmic in the number of users, which makes it more practical
and scalable (a detailed analysis is given in Section V).
5) Robust Against Network Dynamism: When a group of
users join or leave the network, the system security and
performance should be maintained. Unlike its counterparts
(e.g., PPSS [4]), which can deal with the joining/leaving of only
a single user at a time, LPOS can effectively handle multiple,
simultaneous join/leave operations.
II. PRELIMINARIES
CRN System and Sensing Model. We consider a centralized
CRN that consists of a FC and n SUs, as shown in Fig. 1. We
assume that each SU is capable of assessing RSS values of chan-
nels through energy detection methods [3], and communicating
them to FC , which it then combines them to make decisions
TABLE I: Privacy, dynamism handling, fault tolerance and sensing performance of our scheme and previous schemes
Evaluation Location Privacy Dynamism Fault Tolerance Sensing Performance
Our Scheme: LPOS High Multiple yes optimal [7]
Generic
ECC El Gamal Low Multiple yes not optimal
PDAFT [14] Low Multiple yes not optimal
PPSS [4] Medium Single No not optimal
Privacy: If FC can learn the aggregated result we evaluate the privacy to be low since an estimation of sensing reports of some users is possible when there are users leaving/joining
the network. Medium privacy if there is a mechanism to cope with the mentioned problem but still using aggregation. We qualify our scheme to have High privacy since it does not
have this vulnerability. Dynamism: Multiple when the scheme can handle multiple users leaving/joining the network simultaneously and Single when only one SU joining/leaving the
network is supported. Fault Tolerance: whether or not the system still works normally when one of the SUs fails to send its report. Sensing Performance: a scheme is optimal if its
sensing performance is proven to be optimal otherwise it is not optimal
regarding whether channels are available. FC then broadcasts
the final decisions back to SUs.
Half-voting rule. Two reasons motivated our choice of a voting-
based rule over an aggregation-based fusion rule: (i) it has a
better sensing performance than aggregation-based rules [17],
and (ii) it does not expose users to the privacy issues, we
mentioned earlier, that would otherwise be exposed to when
aggregation-based rules are used. The authors in [7] derived
a voting threshold, λ, for optimal spectrum sensing in voting-
based CRNs, which is termed half-voting rule. With this, when
the number of users whose RSS values are greater than τ is
higher than λ, then FC can conclude that the channel is busy.
Notation. Operators || and |x| denote the concatenation and the
bit length of variable x, respectively. x $← S denotes that x is
randomly and uniformly selected from the set S. Large primes
q and p > q such that q|(p − 1), and a generator α of the
subgroup G of order q in Z∗p are selected such that Discrete
Logarithm Problem (DLP) [18] is intractable. (sk ,PK ) denotes
a private/public key pair of ElGamal Encryption [19], generated
under (G, p, q, α). c← OPE .EK(M) denotes order preserving
encryption (as defined in Definition 1) of a message M ∈ {0, 1}d
under private key K, where integer d is the block size of OPE .
Cryptographic Building Blocks. Our scheme utilizes various
cryptographic building blocks, which are described below:
• Order Preserving Encryption (OPE ) [15]:
Definition 1. An OPE is a deterministic symmetric encryption
scheme whose encryption operation preserves the numerical
ordering of the plaintexts, i.e. for any two messages m1 and
m2 s.t. m1 ≤ m2, we have c1 ← OPE .EK(m1) ≤ c2 ←
OPE .EK(m2).
The OPE concept was first formalized by Boldyreva et.
al [15]. Note that our scheme can use any secure OPE scheme
(e.g., [20]) as a building block, and receive the benefits of
the security enhancement (e.g., [20]). However, we chose the
publicly available implementation of Boldyreva’s scheme [15]
so as to evaluate our scheme in terms of execution time. In
[15], an ideal security notion, called indistinguishability under
ordered chosen-plaintext attack (IND-OCPA), was introduced,
which implies that OPE has no leakage, except the order of
ciphertexts. However, Boldyreva et. al [21] showed that the ideal
OPE security is unachievable, since it requires a ciphertext size
that is at least exponential in the size of the plaintext, leading
to the introduction and adoption of a weaker security notion of
Random Order-Preserving Functions (ROPF), as defined below.
Definition 2. An OPE based on ROPF leaks the order of
plaintexts and also at least half of the high-order bits of the
plaintext [21].
• Secure Comparison Protocol: The Yao’s Millionaires’ (YM )
protocol [16] enables two parties to execute “the greater-than”
function, GT (x, y) = [x > y], without disclosing any other
information apart from the outcome of the comparison. We use
an efficient YM scheme [22], referred to as YM .ElGamal ,
which ensures that only the initiator learns the outcome.
Definition 3. Let (X ,Y) and (x, y) ∈ {0, 1}l be two par-
ties and l-bit integers to be compared, respectively. Let pi =
(l, q, p, α, {sk ,PK}) be YM .ElGamal parameters generated
by the protocol initiator X . YM .ElGamal returns a bit b ←
YM .ElGamal (x, y, pi), where b = 0 if x < y and b = 1
otherwise. Only X learns b but (X ,Y) learn nothing else.
YM .ElGamal is secure in the semi-honest setting if ElGamal
encryption scheme [19] is secure.
• Group Key Establishment and Management: We use a
dynamic and contributory group key establishment and man-
agement protocol for secure group communication purposes.
Definition 4. Tree-based Group Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
(TG ECDH) [23] permits n distinct users to collaboratively
establish and update a common group key K by extending 2-
party ECDH key exchange protocol to n-party. TGECDH is
secure if Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)
is intractable [23].
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
Voting-based spectrum sensing offers several advantages over
its aggregation-based counterparts as discussed in Section II.
However, this approach requires comparing FC ’s threshold τ
and the RSS value ri of each user Ui, thereby forcing at least one
of the parties to expose its information to the other. One solution
is to use a secure comparison protocol, such as YM .ElGamal ,
between FC and each user U1, . . . , Un in the network, which
permits FC to learn the total number of users above/below
threshold τ (as discussed in Section I-A) but nothing else.
However, secure comparison protocols involve several costly
public key crypto operations (e.g., modular exponentiation), and
therefore O(n) invocations of such a protocol per sensing period
incur prohibitive computational and communication overhead.
The key observation that led us to overcome this challenge is
the following: If we enable FC to learn the relative order of RSS
Algorithm 1 LPOS Algorithm (the proposed scheme)
Initialization: Executed only once at the beginning.
1: FC sets its energy sensing and optimal voting thresholds
τ and λ, respectively as in [7]. Bit-length γ = |τ | = |r i| for
i = 1, . . . ,n , where r i denotes RSS value of user Ui.
2: FC generates YM .ElGamal parameters pi (as defined in
Definition 3) and pre-computes ElGamal encryption values
in pi based on τ to accelerate YM .ElGamal protocol.
FC also generates a random padding D $← {0, 1}d−γ−1,
where d is the block size of OPE . D is known to all users.
3: There are n users {Ui}ni=1 in the system, whose RSS values
are denoted as r i for i = 1, . . . ,n , respectively.
4: G = {Ui}ni=1 collaboratively establish a group key K via
TGECDH (Definition 4).
5: FC establishes an authenticated secure channel chni with
each user Ui for i = 1, . . . ,n . . (e.g., via SSL/TLS) .
Private Sensing: Executed every sensing period tw
6: Ui computes ci ← OPE .EK(D||r i) for i = 1, . . . ,n .
7: Ui sends ci to FC over chni for i = 1, . . . ,n .
8: FC sorts encrypted RSS values as cmin ≤ . . . ≤ cmax (by
Definition 1).
9: FC initiates YM .ElGamal as b ← YM .ElGamal
(τ , r idmax , pi) with user idmax having the maximum cmax.
10: if b = 1 then
11: decision ← Channel is free.
12: else
13: FC initiates YM .ElGamal as b ← YM .ElGamal(τ ,
r idmin , pi) with user idmin having the minimum cmin.
14: if b = 0 then
15: decision ← Channel is busy.
16: else
17: FC initiates YM .ElGamal with a subset of users
based on a binary search of τ on the remaining encrypted
RSS values as described below. Let index I be the index of
user cI , where YM .ElGamal with binary search process is
finalized (i.e., r I−1 ≤ τ ≤ r I ).
18: FC counts the number of Uis s.t. τ ≤ r i : z ← n−I
19: if z ≥ λ then
20: decision ← Channel is busy
21: else
22: decision ← Channel is free
return decision
Group Membership Change Update:
23: If new user(s) join/leave G in tw, the new set of users G′
forms a new group key K ′ via TGECDH. FC may update
its threshold and YM .ElGamal parameters as λ’ and pi’
when required.
24: Follow the private sensing steps with new (K ′, λ′, pi′).
values but nothing else, then the number of YM .ElGamal in-
vocations can be reduced drastically. That is, the knowledge of
relative order permits FC to execute YM .ElGamal protocol
at worst-case O(log(n)) by utilizing a binary-search type ap-
proach, as opposed to running YM .ElGamal with each user in
total O(n) overhead.
This simple yet powerful observation enables us to develop
LPOS, which achieves the above objective via an innovative
integration of OPE scheme, TGECDH and YM .ElGamal pro-
tocols. The crux of the idea is to make users OPE encrypt their
RSS values under a group key K, which is derived via TGECDH
at the beginning of the sensing period. In this way, FC can
learn the relative order of encrypted RSS values but nothing
else (and users do not learn each others’ RSS values, as they are
sent to FC over a pairwise secure channel). FC then uses this
knowledge to run YM .ElGamal protocol by utilizing a binary-
search strategy, which enables it to identify the total number
of users above/below threshold τ (as defined by voting-based
optimal sensing in [7]) with only O(log(n)) complexity. This
strategy makes LPOS the only alternative among its counterparts
that can achieve CRN location privacy with an optimal spectrum
sensing, fault-tolerance and network dynamism simultaneously
(as discussed in Section I-B and Section V).
We give the detailed description of LPOS in Algorithm 1, and
further outline the high-level description of LPOS as below:
• Initialization: FC sets up spectrum sensing and crypto
parameters for cryptographic building blocks. Users establish a
group key K via TGECDH, with which they will OPE encrypt
their RSS values during the private sensing. FC also establishes
a secure channel chni with each user Ui.
• Private Sensing: Each user Ui OPE encrypts its RSS value
ri with group key K and sends ciphertext ci to FC over chni.
This permits FC to sort ciphertexts as cmin ≤ . . . ≤ cmax
without learning corresponding RSS values, and the secure
channel chni protects the communication of Ui from other users
(as each ri is encrypted under the same K) as well as from
outside attackers. FC then initiates YM .ElGamal first with the
user that has the highest RSS value rmax. If it is smaller than
energy sensing threshold τ then the channel is free. Otherwise,
FC initiates YM .ElGamal with the user that has rmin. If it
is bigger than τ then the channel is busy. Otherwise, to make
the final decision based on the optimal sensing threshold λ,
FC runs YM .ElGamal according to the binary-search strategy
as described in Steps 17-22, which guarantees the decision at
the worst O(log(n)) invocations.
• Update Private Sensing after Group Membership Changes:
At the beginning of each sensing period tw, according to the
membership changes in the user group, a new group key may
be formed via the update procedure of TGECDH efficiently.
FC may optionally update sensing parameters. The private sens-
ing for the new sensing period then begins with new parameters
and group key K ′ and is executed as described above.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Threat Model: Our threat model focuses on the location
privacy (i.e., RSS values) of SUs. We consider honest but curious
(semi-honest) setting for FC and SUs forming group G(no party,
including FC , maliciously modifies the integrity of its input).
This means that they execute the protocol honestly but will show
interest in learning information about the other parties. That
is, FC and other SUs in the group G may target the location
information of a SU Ui. RSS value ri of Ui reveals this location
information and therefore should be protected. SUs also may
target the threshold value τ of FC . However, we assume that
FC does not collude with some SUs to localize the other SUs,
nor do SUs collude with each others or expose the group key
K to FC or external parties maliciously. Similarly, we assume
that FC and SUs do not inject false τ or RSS values into
spectrum sensing. Finally, an external attacker A may launch
passive attacks against the output of cryptographic operations
and active attacks including packet interception/modification to
FC and SUs. We rely on traditional authenticated secure channel
to prevent such an external attacker A.
Security Objectives and Analysis:
Definition 5. Under our threat model described above,
LPOS security objectives are: (i) RSS values ri of each Ui
remain confidential during all sensing periods. (ii) The sensing
threshold τ of FC remains confidential for all sensing periods.
(iii) A secure channel is maintained between each SU and FC .
(iv) Objectives (i)-(iii) are maintained for every membership
changes in G.
It is easy to show that LPOS is secure according to Definition
5, as long as its underlying cryptographic blocks are secure.
Theorem 1. LPOS achieves security objectives in Definition 5,
as long as OPE , YM .ElGamal and TGECDH are secure
according to Definitions 2, 3 and 4, respectively.
Proof. In sensing period tw, objectives (i)-(iv) in Definition 5
are achieved as follows:
Initialization: In Step 1-2, FC sets up system and security pa-
rameters such that YM .ElGamal and OPE are secure. Padding
D and proper block size of OPE ensures the leftmost bit leakage
from OPE as defined in Definition 2 does not leak RSS value
during the private sensing. In Step 4, SUs establish a group K,
which protects ri values against FC via OPE encryption (as
required by (i) in Definition 5). In Step 5, FC and each Ui
establish a secure channel, which protects OPE encrypted ri
values ci (under the same group key K) from other SUs and
external attacker A (as required by (i) and (iii) in Definition 5).
Private Sensing: OPE encryptions in Step 6 ensure the con-
fidentiality of ri values against FC during the ciphertext sorting
(c1,. . . ,cn ) in Step 8, as long as OPE is secure according to
Definition 2 (with proper padding and OPE block size as set
in the initialization phase). Step 7 ensures the confidentiality
of ri of Ui against other SUs as well as the protection of the
communication against an external attacker A via the secure
channel. Hence, objective (i) in Definition 5 is achieved during
OPE phase of LPOS. Step 9 - Step 22 execute YM .ElGamal ,
which leaks no information on τ to SUs and ri’s to FC as
required. Hence, objectives (i)-(iii) in Definition 5 are achieved
during the whole private sensing steps.
Update Private Sensing after Group Membership Changes:
Step 23 ensures that a new group key K ′ (based on Definition
4) and parameters (λ′, pi′) are generated according to the
membership status of the new group G′. Step 24 ensures the
private sensing steps are executed using new (K ′, λ′, pi′) for
each new sensing period. Thus, security objectives (i)-(iv) in
Definition 5 are achieved for all sensing periods as required.
V. ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON
Location Privacy, Sensing Accuracy and Reliability: As
shown in Table I, LPOS achieves the highest level of privacy
and decision accuracy among its counterparts. That is, LPOS is
the only scheme that achieves high location privacy while
enabling an optimal spectrum sensing. Moreover, LPOS provides
fault tolerance and support for dynamism of multiple SUs in
the network, which makes it reliable. In addition, LPOS also
achieves low communication, computation and storage overhead
as discussed below.
Communication, Computation and Storage Overhead: Our
analytical comparison is summarized in Table II, which also
gives detailed explanations about variables, parameter sizes
as well as overhead of building blocks and other schemes
included in this comparison. The cost of LPOS is determined by
YM .ElGamal , OPE , and TGECDH, whose costs are outlined
in Table II. Notice that the overall cost of LPOS is dominated
by YM .ElGamal protocol, and yet YM .ElGamal is invoked
only O(log(n)) at the worst case (as explained in Section III
in detail). This permits high computational and communication
efficiency.
As shown in Fig. 2(a)3, LPOS offers the smallest com-
munication overhead among all alternatives for large network
sizes thanks to O(log(n)) complexity for all public keys to be
transmitted (the small constant OPE per user has little impact on
the overall communication overhead as seen in the Fig. 2(a)).
It is followed by ECEG, who has small key sizes for small
number of users due to compact ECC parameters. PPSS has a
high communication overhead, while PDAFT incurs extremely
large communication overhead due to heavy Pailler encryption.
As shown in Fig. 2(c)4, all compared alternatives are signifi-
cantly more computationally efficient than PPSS, while LPOS is
comparable but little less efficient than ECEG and PDAFT.
Observe that while offering the smallest communication over-
head (vital for scalability) and reasonable computation efficiency,
LPOS is the only scheme that enables optimal spectrum sensing
based on voting approach by also providing the highest level of
location privacy, fault-tolerance and network dynamism.
VI. CONCLUSION
We design a location privacy preserving scheme for CRNs
that achieves high sensing accuracy. Our scheme has several
key features, making it more practical, secure, and reliable
for large-scale CRNs. When compared to existing approaches,
LPOS achieves optimal sensing performances with high location
privacy while being robust against network dynamism.
3Communication overhead of each scheme is calculated by evaluating its corresponding
analytical results in Table II with the parameter sizes given in item (ii)-Table II.
4The execution times were measured on a laptop running Ubuntu 14.10 with 8GB of
RAM and a core M 1.3 GHz Intel processor, with cryptographic libraries MIRACL [27],
Crypto++ [28] and Louismullie’s Ruby implementation of OPE [25].
TABLE II: Communication overhead, computation cost and storage needed of our scheme and previous schemes
Evaluation Communication Computation Storage
FC SU FC SU
Our Scheme: LPOS 2γ · |p| · (2 + log n) + n · OPE + |Q| · log n 1/2 · (2 + log n) · γ · |p| ·Mulp (2γ · |p|+ 2γ) ·Mulp+OPE + 2 log n · PMulQ 4|p| |p|+ |K|
Generic
ECEG 4|Q| · n PMulQ+ PAddQ+√n · δ · Pollard 2PMulQ+ (n − 1) · PAddQ (1 + 2 ·O(log(nδ))) · |Q| |Q|
PDAFT [14] 2|N | · (n + 1) 2ExpN 2 + InvN 2 + y ·MulN 2 2ExpN 2 +MulN 2 2|N | |N |+ |N 2|
PPSS [4] |p| · n H + (n + 2) ·Mulp+ (2γ−1 · n + 2) · Expp H + 2Expp+Mulp (n + 1) · |p| (n + 1) · |p|
(i) Variables: γ: size of the sensing reports, n : number of SUs, N : modulus in Paillier, p: modulus of El Gamal, H: cryptographic hash operation, K: group key used in OPE .
Expu and Mulu denote a modular exponentiation and a modular multiplication over modulus u respectively, where u ∈ {N ,N 2, p}. InvN 2: modular inversion over N 2,
PMulQ: point multiplication of order Q, PAddQ: point addition of order Q. y : number of servers needed for decryption in PDAFT. (ii) Parameter size: For a security parameter
κ = 80, suggested parameter sizes by NIST 2012 are given by : |N | = 1024, |p| = 1024, |Q| = 160 as indicated in [24]. (iii) OPE: the computational complexity of the OPE is
given by OPE = (log |C |+ 1) · THGD + (log |P|+ 3) · (5log |C |+ θ′ + 1)/128 · TAES , where P,C are plaintext and ciphertext spaces respectively and θ′ is a constant.
OPE is the maximum ciphertext size that could be obtained under the OPE encryption. This value was determined experimentally based on the OPE implementation in [25] and we
noticed that it doesn’t exceed the 128bits block size of the underlying AES block cipher ⇒ OPE = 128 bits. (iv) ECEG: The SUs use the FC’s ECEG public key to encrypt their
RSSs and then one node is picked to collect the ciphertexts and multiply them together including its own encrypted RSS and then send the result to the FC. The decryption of the
aggregated message in ECEG is done by solving the constrained ECDLP problem on small plaintext space similarly to [4] via Pollard’s Lambda algorithm, which requires
O(
√
n · δ) · Pollard computation and O(log(nδ)) storage [18], where δ = a− b if RSS ∈ [a, b] and Pollard is the number of point operations in Pollard Lambda algorithm
which varies depending on algorithm implementation used. (v) YM.ElGamal: The communication cost for one comparison is 4γ · |p|. The total computational cost of the scheme for
one comparison is 5γ log p+ 2n . Since in our scenario the value of the energy threshold τ remains unchanged, we can encrypt it only once and offline so the encryption cost can be
omitted and the new total computational cost would be 3γ · |p|+ 2γ for each comparison operation. (vi) TGECDH: It permits the alteration of group membership (i.e., join/leave), on
average O(log(n)) communication and computation (i.e., ECC scalar multiplication) [26].
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Fig. 2: Performance Comparison
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